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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of whether plaintiffs in negligence cases may be entitled
to punitive damages has long been the subject of controversy.' Many
commentators have argued against the propriety of punitive damages
and have concluded that this category of damages should be abol-
ished.2 Others, without necessarily conceding the validity of punitive
damages, have argued that their availability should be limited to a
narrow range of conduct.3 Notwithstanding the views of commenta-
tors, the doctrine is well entrenched in our legal system.4 The contro-
l. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257,
1263-64 (1976); Comment, Punitive Damages Insurance: Why Some Courts Take the Smart
Out of "Smart Money", 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 979, 987 (1986).
2. Compare Carsey, The Case Against Punitive Damages: An Annotated Argumentative
Outline, 11 FORUM 57, 57-63 (1975) (arguing that punitive damages should be abolished) and
Ghiardi, The Case Against Punitive Damages, 8 FORUM 411, 417-19 (1972) (same) with Mallor
& Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 647
(1980) (arguing for the retention of the doctrine of punitive damages) and Note, In Defense of
Punitive Damages, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 303, 327-45 (1980) (same).
3. See Comment, supra note 1, at 987 (arguing that jurists disagree over the propriety,
scope, and purposes of the doctrine); see also Levit, Punitive Damages.- Yesterday, Today and
Tomorrow, 1980 INS. L.J. 257, 261 (arguing that it is "more constructive" to focus on "clear
abuses" of the doctrine than to advocate its abolition).
4. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851); see Mallor & Roberts, supra
note 2, at 639; Owen, supra note 1, at 1263. Punitive damages are currently available in all but
five states. Ausness, Punitive Damages in Products Liability, 74 KY. L.J. 1, 4 & n.9 (1985-86t
Louisiana, Nebraska, and Puerto Rico prohibit punitive damages entirely. Id. Massachusetts
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versy in the various jurisdictions thus has centered around the
conduct and state of mind requirements that must be satisfied before a
jury may award punitive damages. Although virtually all jurisdic-
tions recognize the propriety of punitive damages, courts have
expressed disagreement over the "quantum of culpability" 5 that must
be demonstrated to support such an award.6
Florida has not escaped this controversy.7 The disagreement has
manifested itself in the Supreme Court of Florida's numerous
attempts to formulate a standard that governs whether the issue of
punitive damages should be submitted to a jury. Under the current
standard, the character of negligence necessary to justify an award of
punitive damages is the same as that required to sustain a conviction
for manslaughter. 8 Trial courts, however, have experienced difficulty
in determining what kind of conduct would satisfy this standard
because, as recent cases have revealed, the standard is subject to two
interpretations. Under the first interpretation, recklessness as defined
in the Second Restatement of Torts would be sufficient to justify an
award of punitive damages; under the second, some undefined ele-
ment or aggravating circumstance must also be present.9 Further-
more, once judges allow the jury to consider the issue of punitive
damages, two difficulties arise that prevent it from effectively evaluat-
ing whether a defendant's conduct merits such damages: One prob-
and Washington prohibit punitive damages unless a statute specifically allows their award, and
Connecticut limits punitive damages to the expenses of litigation. Id.
5. Comment, supra note 1, at 989.
6. This disagreement is demonstrated by the variety of terms that jurisdictions have
utilized in formulating their punitive damages standards. Some states, for example, have
required a defendant to commit a tort "maliciously" before allowing punitive damages to be
awarded. See, e.g., Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188, 189 (Fla. 1950) (stating that the malice
that would support an award of punitive damages can be inferred from an entire want of care
to duty); Bennett v. Howard, 141 Tex. 101, 107, 170 S.W.2d 709, 712 (1942) (noting that the
rule is almost universally recognized that punitive damages may be recovered only for injuries
resulting from wrongs that are accompanied by some aggravating circumstances of malice or
fraud). Other states have allowed punitive damages when "willful and wanton" conduct is
involved. See, e.g., Unfried v. Libert, 20 Idaho 708, 728, 119 P. 885, 891 (1911) (predicating
punitive damages on the "wanton, malicious, or gross and outrageous" conduct of the
wrongdoer). Finally, other states have allowed punitive damages when a defendant acts in
"conscious disregard for the rights of others." See, e.g., Honaker v. Leonard, 325 F. Supp.
212, 214 (E.D. Tenn. 1971) (allowing punitive damages for conduct that raises a presumption
of conscious indifference to consequences); Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 2d 260, 267,
294 N.W.2d 437, 442 (1977) (requiring "reckless indifference for others' rights and conscious
deliberate disregard of them").
7. See infra Section II.
8. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer, 499 So. 2d 823, 825 (Fla. 1986); Como Oil Co. v.
O'Loughlin, 466 So. 2d 1061, 1062 (Fla. 1985); White Constr. Co. v. Dupont, 455 So. 2d 1026,
1028 (Fla. 1984).
9. See infra Section IIIA.
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lem relates to the lack of conformity between the standard jury
instruction on punitive damages and the criminal manslaughter stan-
dard, which judges apply to determine if there is any basis in the evi-
dence to support the imposition of punitive damages. The other
problem arises because even if a jury were to apply the criminal man-
slaughter standard, the standard, as currently formulated, lacks suffi-
cient guidelines to inform the jury whether it may award punitive
damages.
This Comment traces the development of the punitive damages
standard in the context of Florida cases involving negligent conduct.
Section II explores the evolution of the current punitive damages
standard as articulated by the principal Supreme Court of Florida
cases. Section IIIA analyzes recent cases in which the supreme court
has applied the current standard. In so doing, the Section attempts to
discover what kind of conduct would satisfy the standard, and consid-
ers whether the standard's most recent formulation can assist trial
courts in deciding if a defendant's conduct is sufficiently culpable to
create a jury question on the issue of punitive damages. Section IIIB
addresses the question of which of the two interpretations of the cur-
rent standard better promotes the purposes of punitive damages.
Finally, Section IIIC examines the respective roles of the judge and
jury in applying the current punitive damages standard.
II. EVOLUTION OF THE FLORIDA STANDARD FOR SUBMITTING
THE ISSUE OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO THE JURY IN
NEGLIGENCE CASES
Courts and commentators have suggested that punitive damages
serve several purposes.' 0 The two principal justifications" that they
have articulated are that punitive damages serve to punish an individ-
10. See Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 5§ S. CAL. L. REV.
1, 3-12 (1982); see also Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 97 Wis. 260, 280, 294 N.W.2d 437, 448
(1980) (stating that the doctrine of punitive damages "discourages private reprisals, restrains
the strong, influential and unscrupulous, vindicates the right[s] of the weak, and encourages
recourse to and confidence in the courts").
11. These justifications find support in the notion that reckless conduct may be so
wrongful that it should be sanctioned regardless of whether the community has defined the
conduct as criminal. See, e.g., Mallor & Roberts, supra note 2, at 644-45. One observer
disagrees with this notion:
If the defendant's conduct has not been of a nature to invoke society's sanctions,
if his entire community has not previously seen fit to call out for punishment of
such acts, there is clearly no reason why a given jury may . . . in an emotion-
ridden court room, enact and enforce punitive measures on an ad hoc basis.
Conrad, Punitive Damages: A Challenge to the Defense, 5 FOR THE DEFENSE 9, 10-11 (1964).
This argument, however, overlooks the fact that a community cannot possibly foresee and
precisely define all conduct that may be morally reprehensible.
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ual for his reckless conduct and to deter him and others from engag-
ing in similar acts in the future. 12 Other justifications for punitive
damages look to their effect on the victim rather than on the wrong-
doer. Punitive damages, for example, help to maintain public order
by offering victims of serious misconduct an alternative to private acts
of vengeance.'" Closely related to the concept of vengeance is the
concept of vindication. Punitive damages vindicate the rights of
injured persons by acting as an "official declaration that they were
wronged by the defendant."' 4 In addition to these justifications, some
courts have recognized the "spur-to-litigation"' 5 rationale. Accord-
ing to this argument, the availability of punitive damages is necessary
to induce injured persons to act as private attorneys general to stop
misconduct. 16
, Relying upon the first two justifications-punishment and deter-
rence-Florida courts over the years have embraced the doctrine of
12. See, e.g., Campbell v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 525, 531 (Fla. 1974)
(stating that punitive damages are imposed "to serve the predominant function of deterrence
and punishment"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979) (Punitive damages are
"awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and
others like him from similar conduct in the future."); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDIES § 3.9, at 204 (1973) (noting that punitive damages are usually awarded as a
punishment or deterrent); see also Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 281, 294 N.W.2d at 449 (stating that
an award of punitive damages "has the effect of bringing to punishment types of conduct that
though oppressive and hurtful to the individual almost invariably go unpunished by the public
prosecutor"). Some businesses, after weighing the risk of paying compensatory damages
against the cost of changing reckless business practices, may accept the risk of future litigation
rather than change their business practices. See Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 285-86, 294 N.W.2d at
451; see also Funk v. Kerbaugh, 222 Pa. 18, 70 A. 953 (1908) (per curiam) (upholding an
award of punitive damages against a defendant who was involved in the construction of a
railroad and decided it would be less expensive to pay damages than to alter its blasting
method). This cost-benefit balance, however, may be affected if punitive damages are injected
into the equation. The possibility that potential defendants will be liable for sums amounting
to more than the amount that would be necessary to compensate injured plaintiffs might
provide a strong disincentive to the continuation of such conduct in the future. Wangen, 97
Wis. 2d at 286, 294 N.W.2d at 451. Any benefit derived from such a business practice might
be outweighed by the risk of having to pay punitive damages. The business entity, therefore,
would be encouraged to change its behavior, to the ultimate benefit of the public.
13. See Campbell, 306 So. 2d at 531 (stating that punitive damages help "to maintain
public tranquillity by permitting the wronged plaintiff to take his revenge in the courtroom and
not by self-help"); Owen, supra note 1, at 1282-83 (arguing that "punishment satisfies the
individual's and society's need for vengeance, and thus serves to rectify some of the negative
effects of prior misconduct"); see also Mallor & Roberts, supra note 2, at 650 (asserting that
"[a]lthough revenge is not a civilized basis for imposing punitive damages, the prevention of
private vengeance clearly is"); Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L.
REV. 517, 521-22 (1957) (suggesting that punitive damages serve the purpose of revenge).
14. Ellis, supra note 10, at 9.
15. Comment, supra note 1, at 988.
16. See, e.g., Wangen, 97 Wis. 2d at 281, 294 N.W.2d at 449; Campbell, 306 So. 2d at 531;
Ellis, supra note 10, at 10.
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punitive damages. 7 More recently, however, courts have taken a
decidedly less favorable view. But before examining the evolution of
the punitive damages standard in Florida, it is necessary to begin with
a general discussion of the various categories of culpable behavior set
out in the Second Restatement of Torts. The Restatement will also
serve as a useful tort framework against which the current Florida
standard will later be analyzed.1"
Under the Restatement, culpable behavior falls into one of three
categories that differ according to the extent of the risk of harm and
the actor's knowledge of that risk. These categories include inten-
tional, reckless, and negligent conduct. Intentional behavior repre-
sents the highest level of culpability and exists if the actor knows that
the harm his behavior may produce is substantially certain to occur. 19
Reckless behavior, the intermediate level of culpability, exists if the
actor knows or has reason to know of a "strong probability" of
harm.20 For recklessness, therefore, it is enough that the actor "real-
izes or, from facts which he knows, should realize"'" that there is a
strong probability that his behavior will result in harm.22 The lowest
degree of culpability, ordinary negligence, exists if an actor engages in
17. Punishment and deterrence are the only justifications for punitive damages that
Florida courts'have accepted. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Pickett, 490 So. 2d 35, 38 (Fla. 1986)
(holding that punitive damages "are imposed as a punishment of the defendant and as a
deterrent to others"); Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So. 2d 545, 549 (Fla. 1981)
(holding that punishment and deterrence are the only purposes of punitive damages); see also
Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer, 126 Fla. 308, 327, 171 So. 214, 221 (1936) (stating that
punitive damages act as "smart money" against the defendant "by way of punishment or
example as a deterrent to others").
18. See infra Section IIIA.
19. According to the Restatement, the actor is engaging in intentional conduct if he
"desires to cause consequences of his act, or [if] he believes that the consequences are
substantially certain to result from [the act]." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A
(1965).
20. See id. § 500 comment f. The Restatement defines recklessness as follows:
The Actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he does an
act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do,
knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable man to
realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm
to another, but also that such risk is substantially greater than that which is
necessary to make his conduct negligent.
Id. § 500. Comment a to section 500 further explains that recklessness may consist of one of
two types of conduct. In one, the actor knows or has reason to know of facts that create a high
degree of risk of physical harm to another and deliberately proceeds to act, or fails to act, in
conscious disregard of that risk. In the other type of conduct, the actor knows or has reason to
know of those facts, but fails to appreciate the high degree of risk involved. Under this second
category, the actor is held to the realization of the aggravated risk even though he himself was
not aware of it. Id. comment a.
21. Id. comment f.
22. Id.
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conduct that creates an unreasonable risk.23 Negligent conduct is
characterized by mere inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness, or
failure to take adequate precautions. 24 It is important to note, how-
ever, that the Restatement allows punitive damages to be awarded if
the defendant acts recklessly.25
A. The Standard Under Early Decisions. Gross Negligence
In the late 1800's, Florida courts permitted the recovery of puni-
tive damages for certain degrees of gross negligence. In Florida
Southern Railway v. Hirst,26 a passenger on a train sued a railroad
company for injuries he suffered as a result of a train collision that
allegedly occurred because of the railroad company's negligence.27
The Supreme Court of Florida held that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury "simply" that gross negligence was sufficient to
warrant an award of punitive damages. 2  The trial court, instead,
should have "confined" the term gross negligence to that extreme
degree of negligence that would be present if the "negligence [was] of
a gross and flagrant character, evincing reckless disregard of human
life ... or a grossly careless disregard of the safety and welfare of the
public."' 29 Under this reasoning, punitive damages would be consid-
ered appropriate if a case involved an extreme degree of gross
negligence.
Shortly before establishing the criminal manslaughter standard,30
the Supreme Court of Florida, in Griffith v. Shamrock Village, Inc., ,
again allowed punitive damages to be imposed for gross negligence.
23. See id. § 282 & comment e. As compared to recklessness, negligence involves conduct
that subjects another to an unreasonable risk that falls below the level of a strong probability of
harm. See id. § 500 comments f & g.
24. Id. comment g.
25. The Restatement provides that "[p]unitive damages may be awarded for conduct that
is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless indifference to the rights of
others." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979).
26. 30 Fla. 1, 11 So. 506 (1892).
27. Id. at 13-15, II So. at 507.
28. Id. at 39, I1 So. at 513. According to the supreme court, the instruction was defective
because it left the jury "to its own ideas, whatever they [were], as to what want of care
constitutes the gross negligence authorizing the allowance of [punitive] damages." Id.
29. Id. As support for this standard, the court relied on Florida Railway & Navigation Co.
v. Webster, in which an injured train passenger sued a railroad company for failure to maintain
its track. 25 Fla. 394, 416, 420-21, 5 So. 714, 718, 719-20 (1889). In Webster, the Supreme
Court of Florida held that a jury could award punitive damages if the "negligence was so gross
as to amount to misconduct and recklessness." Id. at 419, 5 So. at 719.
30. The Supreme Court of Florida established the criminal manslaughter standard for
punitive damages in Carraway v. Revell, 116 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1959). For a discussion of
Carraway, see infra notes 35-44 and accompanying text.
31. 94 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1957).
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In Griffith, a tenant sued his landlord to recover compensatory and
punitive damages, contending that the landlord had voluntarily
assumed the duty of receiving telephone messages for his tenants and
that, by failing to deliver a message, the landlord evidenced a lack of
care and inattention to his duty that constituted gross negligence. 32
The supreme court reversed the trial court's directed verdict, holding
that there was sufficient evidence to support this contention.33 In
what appeared to be a relaxation of the Hirst standard, the court
stated: "[P]unitive damages can be recovered in actions such as this
and .. .malice may be imputed to defendant from gross negligence,
i.e., a want of slight care."34
B. The Emergence of the Criminal Manslaughter Standard.:
Carraway v. Revell
In 1959, the Supreme Court of Florida seized upon an opportu-
nity to revise the standard that governs whether punitive damages
may be awarded even though the particular case, Carraway v.
Revell,35 did not involve a punitive damages issue. In Carraway, the
plaintiff sued the driver of an automobile under a Florida guest stat-
ute36 to recover compensatory damages for the death of his son, a
passenger in the vehicle.37 The trial judge granted judgment for the
defendant, reasoning that because the requirement of gross negligence
under the guest statute was the same as the element of culpable negli-
gence under the criminal manslaughter statute, compensatory dam-
ages could not be recovered unless the negligence was of a degree that
would be sufficient to warrant a manslaughter conviction.38 Under
32. Id. at 855.
33. Id. at 858.
34. Id. (emphasis added). At least two district courts of appeal differ over whether Griffith
represents the current state of the law. Compare Paterson v. Deeb, 472 So. 2d 1210, 1221 (Fla.
1st DCA 1985) ("We find nothing in Como Oil... and White Construction ... which suggests
that the supreme court has overruled or otherwise limited the rule in [Griffith]."), revs. denied,
484 So. 2d 8 (Fla.), 484 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1986) with Ten Assocs. v. Brunson, 492 So. 2d 1149,
1151 & n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA) (dicta) (disagreeing with the Paterson court's view of Griffith), rev.
denied, 501 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 1986).
35. 116 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1959).
36. The Florida guest statute provided in part as follows:
No person transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest
or passenger, without payment for such transportation, shall have a cause of
action for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in
case of accident, unless such accident shall have been caused by the gross
negligence or willful and wanton misconduct of the owner or operator of such
motor vehicle ....
FLA. STAT. § 320.59 (1971), repealed by Ch. 72-1, §§ 1-2, Laws of Fla. (1972).
37. Carraway, 116 So. 2d at 18.
38. Id. Section 782.07 of the Florida Statutes defines manslaughter as the "killing of a
1988]
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this view, therefore, gross negligence and culpable negligence were
treated as synonymous. On certiorari, the supreme court rejected this
reasoning and defined gross negligence under the guest statute as
"that kind or degree of negligence which lies in the area between ordi-
nary negligence" 39 and the kind of misconduct that would warrant a
conviction for manslaughter.40 In dicta, the court attempted to
explain the distinction between gross negligence and the culpable neg-
ligence element of criminal manslaughter by noting that "the charac-
ter of negligence necessary to sustain a conviction for manslaughter is
the same as that required to sustain a recovery for punitive dam-
ages."'" In its opinion, the Carraway court defined the type of con-
duct that would justify an award of punitive damages:
The character of negligence necessary to sustain an award of puni-
tive damages must be of "a gross and flagrant character, evincing
reckless disregard of human life, or of the safety of persons exposed
to its dangerous effects, or there is that entire want of care which
would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to conse-
quences, or which shows wantonness or recklessness, or a grossly
careless disregard of the safety and welfare of the public, or that
reckless indifference to the rights of others which is equivalent to
an intentional violation of them."42
According to the court, therefore, this standard encompassed conduct
that went beyond gross negligence, which was the required degree of
negligence under the guest statute.
The supreme court's decision in Carraway had the potential for
producing far reaching effects. The case might have marked a water-
shed in Florida tort law by once and for all eliminating gross negli-
gence as a basis for awarding punitive damages.43 On the other hand,
Carraway might have simply represented an aberration, a peculiar
case limited to a now defunct guest statute.44
human being by act, procurement or culpable negligence of another, without lawful
justification." FLA. STAT. § 782.07 (1987).
39. Carraway, 116 So. 2d at 22.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 20 (quoting Carraway v. Revell, 112 So. 2d 71, 75 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev'd on other
grounds, 116 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1959)).
42. Id. at 20 n.12.
43. The punitive damages standards that the supreme court articulated in Carraway and
Florida Southern Railway v. Hirst, 30 Fla. 1, 11 So. 506 (1892), were virtually identical. See
Carraway, 116 So. 2d at 20 n.12; Hirst, 30 Fla. at 38-39, 11 So. at 513. Yet the court's
interpretation of what conduct would fulfill the standards in these two cases was inconsistent.
Hirst provided for punitive damages to be awarded in cases involving certain extreme degrees
of gross negligence. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. Carraway, in contrast,
separated gross negligence and the negligence necessary to support an award of punitive
damages into two mutually exclusive categories. See Carraway, 116 So. 2d at 22.
44. The court could have confined the criminal manslaughter standard for punitive
[Vol. 42:803
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C. The Departure from Carraway
Following Carraway, Florida courts applied a number of punitive
damages standards, and as a result, Carraway proved to have little
effect on Florida tort law.45 Although some district courts of appeal
followed Carraway by requiring conduct more severe than gross negli-
gence for punitive damages to be awarded, 6 others continued to allow
punitive damages for extreme degrees of gross negligence. 47  Subse-
quently, the supreme court added to this assortment of standards by
introducing the "public wrong" theory for punitive damages.48
In Ingram v. Pettit,4 9 for example, the supreme court used this
theory to declare drunk driving to be reckless conduct.5 0 Ingram
involved a suit for compensatory and punitive damages against an
automobile driver who caused a collision. Although the defendant
damages to guest statute cases only. Because the guest statute already required gross
negligence for compensatory damages, the court had to require something more for punitive
damages. Otherwise, as the Carraway court itself recognized, a successful claimant under the
guest statute would necessarily have been entitled to recover both punitive damages and
compensatory damages. 116 So. 2d at 21.
45. See, e.g., Atlas Properties, Inc. v. Didich, 226 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1968) (upholding an
award of punitive damages without making reference to either the criminal manslaughter
standard or Carraway); see also Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Coulter, 426 So. 2d 1108 (Fla. 4th
DCA) (same), rev. denied, 436 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1983); American Motors Corp. v. Ellis, 403 So.
2d 459 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981) (same), rev. denied, 415 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 1982). But cf.
Castlewood Int'l Corp. v. LaFleur, 322 So. 2d 520, 521 n.1 (Fla. 1975) (suggesting that the
lower court's opinion would have conflicted with Carraway if it had upheld a punitive damages
award by a jury that had been clearly instructed that it could award punitive damages for gross
negligence). In Atlas, a plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against his landlord for the
loss of his daughter who drowned as a result of having had her arm caught in an uncovered
pool drain. The Supreme Court of Florida held that the evidence introduced at trial was
sufficient to sustain an award of punitive damages. Atlas, 226 So. 2d at 690. The evidence
showed that the pool was unsupervised; the drain was missing a cover in violation of safety
statutes; the landlord was repeatedly warned of dangers involved in operating a pool without a
drain cover; the landlord failed to warn its tenants of the condition; and the landlord chose to
save money rather than remedy the dangerous condition. Atlas Properties, Inc. v. Didich, 213
So. 2d 278, 279 (Fla. 3d DCA), aff'd, 226 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1968). It is far from certain that
these facts would have been sufficient to support a punitive damage award if Atlas had been
decided after White Construction Co. v. Dupont, 455 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1984).
46. See, e.g., Ellis v. Golconda Corp., 352 So. 2d 1221, 1225 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), cert.
denied sub nom. Peterson v. McKenzie Tank Lines, 365 So. 2d 715 (Fla. 1978); Florida Power
Corp. v. Scudder, 350 So. 2d 106, 110 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), cert. denied, 362 So. 2d 1056 (Fla.),
appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 922 (1978); Carter v. Lake Wales Hosp. Ass'n, 213 So. 2d 898, 900
(Fla. 2d DCA 1968).
47. See, e.g., Monty v. Hayward, 451 So. 2d 938, 938 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), rev. denied,
461 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1985); K.D. Lewis Enters. Corp. v. Smith, 445 So. 2d 1032, 1038 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1984).
48. See Arab Termite & Pest Control of Fla., Inc. v. Jenkins, 409 So. 2d 1039, 1042 (Fla.
1982); Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So. 2d 922, 923-24 (Fla. 1976).
49. 340 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 1976).
50. Id. at 924-25.
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was legally intoxicated at the time of the accident, there was no evi-
dence that he was operating the vehicle abnormally.5 Citing Car-
raway, the defendant contended that punitive damages could be
awarded only if there was willful conduct equivalent to that in a crim-
inal manslaughter case.5 2 The supreme court rejected this contention
because it focused exclusively on semantic distinctions between
degrees of negligence rather than on the policies that the distinctions
were intended to further.5 3 Instead, the court advocated an approach
that emphasizes the policy of deterring future harm to the public and
thus concluded that punitive damages should be awarded only in
those cases in which "private injuries partake of public wrongs." 54 In
light of the state's policy against highway accidents, driving while
intoxicated constitutes a public menace that should be deterred by
punishment.55 The court therefore held that a jury may award puni-
tive damages against an intoxicated driver who was involved in an
accident regardless of whether there was "external proof of careless-
ness or abnormal driving," because driving while intoxicated
"evinces, without more, a sufficiently reckless attitude."56 Despite the
court's statement to the contrary,57 this holding appears to undermine
the traditional requirement of proof of proximate cause. That is, by
not requiring any external manifestation of reckless driving, the court
was allowing punitive damages to be awarded even if a plaintiff was
unable to trace the injury arising from an automobile accident to the
alleged reckless act-driving while intoxicated. 8 In contrast, Car-
raway suggested that the conduct allegedly warranting punitive dam-
ages must itself be of a "gross and flagrant character" before punitive
damages may be properly awarded. 9 Thus, driven by social policy
considerations against drunk driving,6" Ingram marked a significant
retreat from the Carraway criminal manslaughter standard.
In later cases, the Supreme Court of Florida, without making
51. Id. at 923.
52. Id,
53. Id. at 924.
54. Id. at 923-24.
55. Id. at 924-25. The supreme court relied heavily on the public policy evidenced by laws
outlawing drunk driving. See id. at 925 & n.12.
56. Id. at 924 (emphasis added).
57. Id.
58. As Justice Sundberg argued in dissent, the majority was "totally emasculating the
principle of proximate causation" at least in situations such as the one at bar "where there
[was] no evidence at all that the intoxication caused any irregularities in the operation of the
vehicle." Id. at 926 (Sundberg, J., dissenting).
59. See Carraway v. Revell, 116 So. 2d 16, 20 & n.12 (Fla. 1959). For a discussion of
Carraway, see supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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reference to Carraway or the criminal manslaughter standard, passed
over the issue of when punitive damages may properly be considered
by the jury.6' In Arab Termite & Pest Control of Florida, Inc. v. Jen-
kins,62 for example, a jury awarded the plaintiff both compensatory
and punitive damages for the wrongful death of her husband.63 The
plaintiff's husband died after he reentered his fumigated house, which
the defendant, a pest control service, had negligently aerated. 6" The
Second District Court of Appeal reversed a remittitur granted by the
trial court, holding that the trial court had erred in finding the award
excessive.65 The supreme court reversed the district court's deci-
sion,6 6 and ruled that a legal basis for punitive damages existed if a
tort was committed "in an outrageous manner or with fraud, malice,
wantonness or oppression. 67
This standard represents an abandonment of the Carraway
approach. The Arab Termite standard focused on the subjective state
of mind of the defendant.6" The Carraway standard, in contrast,
61. See Arab Termite & Pest Control of Fla., Inc. v. Jenkins, 409 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1982);
Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1978); cases cited supra note 45.
62. 409 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1982). Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430 (Fla. 1978),
an earlier case, also marked a departure by the supreme court from Carraway. In Wackenhut,
the plaintiff, a customer, brought a battery and negligence action against a store to recover
compensatory and punitive damages for injuries he sustained when the store's security guard
pulled on his colostomy bag. Id. at 431. At trial, the jury awarded the plaintiff $180,000 in
punitive damages in addition to $50,000 in compensatory damages. Id. at 432. The trial judge
granted the defendant's motion for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages after the
plaintiff refused to accept a remittitur. Id. On appeal, the Third District Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court and reinstated the punitive damage award. Id. The Supreme Court of
Florida affirmed the Third District's decision, holding that the $180,000 punitive damage
award was proper, not excessive. Id. at 435. Making no reference to Carraway, the supreme
court ruled that it was proper to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury if a tort was
committed "in an outrageous manner or with fraud, malice, wantonness, or oppression," and
that punitive damages were thereafter left to the jury's discretion. Id. at 435-36.
63. Arab Termite, 409 So. 2d at 1040.
64. Id.
65. Jenkins v. Arab Termite & Pest Control Serv. of Fla., Inc., 388 So. 2d 44, 45 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1980), rev'd, 409 So. 2d 1039 (Fla. 1982).
66. The supreme court held that the trial judge could find the amount of the jury verdict to
be excessive if it bore an insufficient relationship to the degree of the defendant's misconduct.
Arab Termite, 409 So. 2d at 1043.
67. Id. at 1041 (citing Winn & Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer, 126 Fla. 308, 327, 171 So.
214, 221 (1936)). Relying on Ingram, the supreme court in Arab Termite also restated the
"public wrong" theory of punitive damages. Id. at 1042. It is interesting to note that the
wrongful conduct that the court confronted in Arab Termite-negligent ventilation of a
fumigated house-affected the public in an entirely different manner than the wrongful act in
Ingram-driving while intoxicated.
68. The Arab Termite standard focuses on the defendant's subjective state of mind rather
than on the nature of his conduct because, in paraphrasing the Winn & Lovett opinion, the
Arab Termite court failed to include from that opinion the following language that would
require conduct that could be objectively ascertained: Punitive damages are awarded in cases
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related to objective acts and required that the defendant's conduct be
''gross and flagrant" or demonstrate an "entire want of care which
would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to conse-
quences or which shows wantonness. ' 69 Moreover, it is unlikely that
the pest control service's conduct in Arab Termite would have war-
ranted punitive damages if the court had applied the criminal man-
slaughter standard because the exterminators lacked sufficient
knowledge of the risk created by their conduct to satisfy the knowl-
edge element of recklessness.7"
D. The Return to Carraway: White Construction Co. v. Dupont
In the 1984 case of White Construction Co. v. Dupont,7 the
Supreme Court of Florida attempted to resolve the controversy
regarding the appropriate punitive damages standard by readopting
the Carraway criminal manslaughter standard, and thus requiring
more than gross negligence for punitive damages to be awarded. In
this case, the plaintiff, an independent truck driver, sued the defend-
ants, which respectively owned a loader and a mine,72 to recover for
injuries he sustained at the mining site. 73 The litigation arose after
one of the defendant's employees drove the forty ton loader "at top
speed"74 and collided with the plaintiff's truck, causing it to run him
over. 75 The evidence showed that the loader's brakes had not been
working for some time and that the defendants were aware of this
in which torts are committed "with such gross negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard of
the rights of others." Winn & Lovett, 126 Fla. at 327, 171 So. at 221 (emphasis added). This
omission might have been more significant (by foreshadowing a higher standard) if it were not
for the fact that the Arab Termite court allowed punitive damages for conduct that appeared to
be at most grossly negligent. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
69. Carraway v. Revell, 116 So. 2d 16, 20 & n.12 (Fla. 1959); supra text accompanying
notes 41-42.
70. As reported by the supreme court, the evidence merely showed that the pest control
service used a pesticide that was not specified in the contract and that the exterminator's
employees "negligently aerated the house." Arab Termite, 409 So. 2d at 1040. This conduct
probably would not fulfill the definition of recklessness contained in the Restatement. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965). Although this evidence might suggest that
the exterminator's conduct created a strong probability of harm, it does not show that the
exterminator knew or had reason to know of this risk, i.e., no facts showed that the
exterminator had any reason to believe that anyone would reenter the fumigated house before
it was safe to do so.
71. 455 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1984).
72. The defendant White Construction Co., which owned the loader, leased it to the other
defendant, Limerock Industries, Inc. Id. at 1027. Both defendants were closely held
corporations with a common controlling shareholder. White Constr. Co. v. Dupont, 430 So.
2d 915, 916 n.2 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), rev'd, 455 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1984).
73. White, 455 So. 2d at 1027.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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condition.76 According to the supreme court, Carraway v. Revel 17
set forth the appropriate standard for the judge to apply in determin-
ing whether the jury may consider the issue of punitive damages: 78
"[T]he character of negligence necessary to sustain a conviction for
manslaughter is the same as that required to sustain a recovery of
punitive damages." '79 Under this standard, "something more than
gross negligence is needed to justify the imposition of punitive dam-
ages." 8 In the words of the court:
The character of negligence necessary to sustain an award of puni-
tive damages must be of a "gross and flagrant character, evincing
reckless disregard of human life, or of the safety of persons exposed
to its dangerous effects, or there is that entire want of care which
would raise the presumption of a conscious indifference to conse-
quences, or which shows wantonness or recklessness, or a grossly
careless disregard of the safety and welfare of the public, or that
reckless indifference to the rights of others which is equivalent to
an intentional violation of them." 81
Without articulating its reasoning, the supreme court held that
although the evidence "would be sufficient to show that the [defend-
ants] were negligent," it was insufficient, "as a matter of law," to raise
a triable issue of punitive damages.82
III. COMMENT
A. The Two Alternative Interpretations of the Current Standard for
Submitting the Issue of Punitive Damages to the Jury in
Negligence Cases
The White criminal manslaughter standard cannot be understood
without recognizing a distinction between the way the court verbally
formulated the standard and the way the court apparently meant it to
be applied. The White criminal manslaughter standard purports to be
a more stringent standard than the earlier standards, which had
allowed recovery for gross negligence. Ironically, however, the stan-
76. Id. at, 1028.
77. 116 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1959).
78. Subsequent cases reveal that the supreme court intended the appellate courts to apply
this standard in reviewing both actual jury awards and directed verdicts. See, e.g., Como Oil
Co. v. O'Loughlin, 466 So. 2d 1061, 1062 (Fla. 1985) (upholding the trial court's directed
verdict on the issue of punitive damages under the criminal manslaughter standard).
79. White, 455 So. 2d at 1028 (quoting Carraway, 116 So. 2d at 20). In adopting the
criminal manslaughter standard, the court gave no indication that it intended to limit punitive
damages to only those situations in which deaths had occurred.
80. Id.
81. Id. (quoting Carraway, 116 So. 2d at 20 n.12).
82. Id.
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dard that the court articulated in White actually originated in an ear-
lier case, Florida Southern Railway v. Hirst,13 that had allowed
punitive damages to be recovered for certain kinds of gross
negligence.
White reaffirmed the punitive damages standard set forth in Car-
raway v. Revell,84 which had adopted the standard that appeared in
the criminal manslaughter case of Cannon v. State.85 Cannon, how-
ever, borrowed its standard from Hirst, in which the court allowed
punitive damages to be recovered for certain extreme degrees of gross
negligence.8 6 Thus, although the supreme court in White stated that
it was adopting a standard that would permit judges to submit the
issue of punitive damages to a jury in cases in which the defendant's
conduct would satisfy the criminal manslaughter standard, and thus
constituted more than gross negligence, the court actually defined
that conduct in terms that it had earlier construed as including some
degrees of gross negligence. The court's verbal formulation of the
kind of conduct that would merit punitive damages in White, there-
fore, was no more stringent than the standard established in earlier
cases.
The seeming contradiction between the supreme court's pur-
ported adoption of a criminal manslaughter standard and its reliance
on a definition that it had previously interpreted to include gross neg-
ligence can be adequately explained only if the supreme court
intended lower courts to follow its actions, and ignore what the court
explicitly said. Thus, to figure out what the standard means, lower
courts have had to watch the manner in which the supreme court has
applied the standard. Yet even a focus on the court's actions provides
incomplete guidance because, in promulgating the standard, the court
has failed to set forth any kind of coherent approach for determining
what conduct merits punitive damages. Observers and lower courts
thus have been left only to guess why the supreme court arrives at any
given result.
The Restatement, however, offers a useful theoretical framework
that focuses the discussion of when punitive damages may be awarded
83. 30 Fla. 1, 11 So. 506 (1892).
84. 116 So. 2d 16, 20 n.12 (Fla. 1959).
85. 91 Fla. 214, 221, 107 So. 360, 363 (1926). Cannon involved a prosecution brought
under the manslaughter statute. For the relevant text of the current version of this statute, see
supra note 38. In attempting to define the term "culpable negligence" in the statute, the
supreme court stated in dicta that the degree of negligence necessary to justify a conviction
should be at least as high as that required for an award of punitive damages in a civil case. Id.
at 222, 107 So. at 362-63.
86. Hirst, 30 Fla. at 39, 11 So. at 513; see supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
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to two factors. As discussed earlier, the Restatement defines conduct
as reckless and therefore suitable for punitive damages if (1) it creates
a strong probability of harm, and (2) the actor knows or has reason to
know of this risk.8 v In analyzing the recent supreme court cases
under the Restatement criteria, the question that must be addressed is
whether conduct that would fulfill the Restatement definition of reck-
lessness would be sufficient under the White criminal manslaughter
standard to create a jury question on the issue of punitive damages, or
whether something more is also required.
Of all the cases decided under the criminal manslaughter stan-
dard, White is the most perplexing. Because the court failed to articu-
late any reasoning, the case may be interpreted in two ways: As
requiring only Restatement recklessness or as requiring, in addition to
Restatement recklessness, some undefined element or aggravating cir-
cumstance, such as flagrant misconduct. As it was fairly likely that
the defendants' conduct in White created a strong probability of
harm' 8 the critical issue, in determining which of these two interpre-
tations is correct, is whether the defendants knew or had reason to
know of the strong probability of harm that their conduct created.
White may be interpreted as being consistent with the Restate-
ment definition of recklessness if the defendants had no actual or con-
structive knowledge that their conduct was creating a high risk of
harm. The facts showed that the defendants knew that the loader's
brakes had not been working for some time 9.8  Knowledge of this fact
alone, however, would not be sufficient to establish the knowledge
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 & comment f (1965); see supra notes 20-25
and accompanying text.
88. This conclusion can be reached only after engaging in a proximate cause analysis
because another actor, the driver of the loader, also contributed to the creation of the risk.
The defendants' conduct, allowing the loader to be operated with defective brakes, by itself,
probably did not create a risk that amounted to a strong probability of harm. Rather, the act
of the driver of the loader, by driving at top speed, raised the risk to a much greater likelihood
of harm. The question therefore is whether the defendants' conduct, and not that of the driver,
created a strong probability of harm. To resolve this question it is necessary to consider
whether the defendants could have foreseen the possibility that the driver of the loader might
contribute to the risk of harm. See Florida Dep't of Transp. v. Anglin, 502 So. 2d 896, 898
(Fla. 1987); Gibson v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., 386 So. 2d 520, 522 (Fla. 1980); Waters v. ITT
Rayonier, Inc., 493 So. 2d 67, 68-69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 501 (1965) (stating that the rules for determining if an actor is liable for
recklessness "are the same as those which determine his liability for negligent misconduct").
Although few facts are reported in White, it seems reasonably foreseeable that the driver of a
loader that hauls material at a mining site on occasion might drive at excessive speeds to satisfy
relevant working quotas or timetables. Because the intervening cause, the employee's act of
driving the loader at top speed, was reasonably foreseeable, the defendants' failure to maintain
the loader's brakes could have created a strong probability of harm.
89. White Constr. Co. v. Dupont, 455 So. 2d 1026, 1028 (Fla. 1984).
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required under the Restatement (i.e., knowledge of a strong
probability of harm) because the defective brakes, by themselves,
probably did not create a strong probability of harm.9° They merely
created an unreasonable risk. Rather, the existence of defective
brakes coupled with the fact that the loader was driven "at top
speed"'" raised the risk to a strong probability of harm.
The crucial question in determining whether the defendants were
aware of a strong probability of harm, therefore, is whether, in addi-
tion to being aware that the loader's brakes were defective, they knew
or had reason to know that the loader would be driven at top speed.
Given the court's failure to articulate any reasoning, a definitive
answer to this question is impossible. Nevertheless, the court's opin-
ion can support an argument that the defendants were not aware that
the loader would be driven at high speeds:
The evidence in this case showed that the loader's brakes had
not been working for some time, and that the [defendants] were
aware of this fact. Although this evidence would be sufficient to
show that the [defendants] were negligent, it is not sufficient as a
matter of law, to submit the issue of punitive damages to the
jury. 92
The direct implication of this passage is that the evidence did not
show that the defendants were aware that the loaders would be driven
at top speed. 93 Thus, the defendants had no knowledge or reason to
know that their failure to repair the brakes caused a strong
probability of harm. The supreme court's denial of punitive damages
was therefore consistent with the Restatement's definition of
recklessness.
White, however, contains some language that supports the con-
trary argument: The court is requiring more than the Restatement
definition of recklessness because the defendants did have knowledge
that their behavior was creating a strong probability of harm. The
basis of this argument lies in the court's rather cryptic statement that
90. See supra note 88.
91. White, 455 So. 2d at 1027.
92. Id. at 1028.
93. The First District Court of Appeal rejected the argument that White stood for the
proposition that "punitive damages cannot be recovered even when the defendant has actual
knowledge of a hazard and yet fails to warn or take corrective action." Johns-Manville Sales
Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So. 2d 242, 263 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), rev. denied, 467 So. 2d 999 (Fla.
1985). Instead, the First District distinguished White as a case that involved "nothing more
than a single isolated instance of negligence, i.e., the defendant operated the loader even
though aware that its brakes were defective." Id. In offering this distinction, the court may
have been suggesting that the defendants in White lacked the sufficient level of knowledge for
punitive damages to be imposed.
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it did not need to address the defendants' argument that the trial
court erred in allowing the plaintiffs' "safety expert to testify that [the
defendants] were 'knowingly exposing people to injury or death.' "'
The existence of this testimony would indicate that the record con-
tained some evidence that could have shown that the defendants knew
of a strong probability of harm. In light of this evidence, the court's
ruling that punitive damages should not have been awarded as a mat-
ter of law suggests that the court was requiring something more than
Restatement recklessness.
With one exception,95 the cases decided since White do little to
resolve the issue left open by that case: Whether the White criminal
manslaughter standard requires something more than the Restate-
ment's requirements for recklessness before the judge may submit the
issue of punitive damages to the jury. The court in these cases did not
reach this question because the conduct at issue did not meet even the
threshold of the Restatement requirements.
The conduct in Como Oil Co. v. O'Loughlin,9 6 the first case that
the Supreme Court of Florida decided after White that is relevant to
this issue, rose, at most, to the level of gross negligence. In Como Oil,
the plaintiff sought punitive damages against an oil company for inju-
ries she suffered in a gasoline explosion and fire that resulted from the
negligence of the defendant's employee.97 The explosion occurred
after the employee, a truck driver, overfilled a gasoline storage tank.98
The evidence merely showed that the driver failed to check the
amount of gasoline in the tank before pumping the gasoline and that
he "watched the flow meter on the truck rather than the actual filling
operation."99 The supreme court held that this evidence did not sat-
isfy the White criminal manslaughter standard. 100 Although the court
did not fully articulate its reasoning, it appears certain that the
driver's conduct failed to satisfy the Restatement's definition of reck-
lessness. The driver was "simply careless,"' 0 ' and thus had no knowl-
94. White, 455 So. 2d at 1029.
95. See Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer, 499 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1986). For a discussion of
Wolmer, see infra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
96. 466 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1985).
97. Id. at 1061.
98. Id. The driver permitted between 50 and 350 gallons of gasoline to be introduced into
an underground tank, and as a result, the tank overflowed. Id. at 1061-62.
99. Id. at 1062. According to the dissenting opinion, there was also evidence that the
truck driver left the truck unattended while pumping was in progress "even though it was
pointed out to him that the equipment and truck were leaking." Id. at 1063 (Shaw & Erlich,
JJ., concurring and dissenting).
100. Id. at 1062.
101. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 42, Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer, 499 So. 2d 823
(Fla. 1986) (No. 67761).
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edge that his conduct was creating a risk of harm. 0 2
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Florida, in American Cyanamid
Co. v. Roy,'0 3 was unable to answer whether the White criminal man-
slaughter standard requires something more than Restatement reck-
lessness because the conduct involved in that case did not create a
strong probability of harm. In American Cyanamid, the plaintiff
brought suit against Cyanamid to recover compensatory and punitive
damages for injuries he suffered after being exposed to a toxic chemi-
cal contained in one of the company's products."° The supreme
court rejected the argument that Cyanamid's negligence in failing to
warn users of the chemical's dangers rose to the level necessary to
support an award of punitive damages.' 05 Rather, the content of the
warning0 6 and Cyanamid's behavior in submitting information of the
product's dangerous propensities to the product's suppliers in no way
suggested "even gross negligence, much less intentional miscon-
duct."' 1 7 Under a Restatement analysis, it appears that if Cyanamid
had apprised potential users of the product's dangers, the risk would
have been reduced to something less than a strong probability of
harm. Cyanamid's conduct therefore did not even meet the Restate-
ment's definition of recklessness.
Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer,10 the most recent of the supreme
court's decisions concerning the appropriate punitive damages stan-
dard, may offer some insight as to what the White criminal man-
slaughter standard requires. The basis of the court's jurisdiction in
Wolmer suggests that the criminal manslaughter standard requires
something more than Restatement recklessness, but the court's man-
ner of deciding the merits of the case reduces the likelihood that this
is a definitive interpretation. In Wolmer, the plaintiff, an owner of a
Chrysler automobile, brought a wrongful death action against
Chrysler for the loss of his wife, alleging that the company's negligent
design of the vehicle's fuel system caused his wife's death in an auto-
mobile accident.'0 9 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the
102. Nor would he have had any reason to know that he was creating a risk if the truck's
flow meter gave him no indication that the tank was overflowing.
103. 498 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1986).
104. Id. at 860. Acrylamide, the toxic chemical in the product, had been linked to a variety
of conditions ranging from neuropathy and atasia to severe skin eruptions. Id.
105. Id. at 862.
106. The warning label noted that the product contained acrylamide and stated that
"[r]epeated skin contact, inhalation or swallowing may cause nervous system disturbances."
Id.
107. Id.
108. 499 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1986).
109. Id. at 824.
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trial court's directed verdict on the issue of punitive damages."' The
supreme court granted review under its conflict jurisdiction, finding
that because the Fourth District applied a standard that the First Dis-
trict had formulated in Johns-Man ville Sales Corp. v. Janssens,"' the
lower court's opinion "expressly and directly conflict[ed]" with the
court's criminal manslaughter standard cases of Como Oil and
White. ' 12
The source of conflict, the Johns-Manville standard, bears a close
resemblance to the Restatement recklessness standard. The Johns-
Manville standard allows punitive damages if the plaintiff can show
that the manufacturer had "knowledge that its product [was] inher-
ently dangerous ... and that its continued use [was] likely to cause
injury or death, but nevertheless continue[d] to market the prod-
uct."' 13 Thus, the Johns-Manville standard, like the Restatement,
requires knowledge of a likelihood of harm. By ruling that this stan-
dard conflicts with White, the court in effect suggested that the crimi-
nal manslaughter standard requires conduct more severe than
Restatement recklessness. The court, however, by deciding on the
merits that Chrysler was not liable for punitive damages because it
lacked actual knowledge of the risk,1 4 was relieved of the necessity of
explaining exactly how the Johns-Manville standard conflicted with
White, that is, what element is needed in addition to knowledge of a
likelihood of harm. Consequently, Florida law today remains unclear
as to whether the White criminal manslaughter standard requires
something more than traditional Restatement recklessness. If in fact
such an additional element is required, its identity remains
uncertain. 115
110. Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer, 474 So. 2d 834, 839 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), rev'd, 499 So. 2d
823 (Fla. 1986).
111. 463 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), rev. denied, 467 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1985).
112. Wolmer, 499 So. 2d at 824-25.
113. Wolmer, 474 So. 2d at 836 (quoting Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So. 2d
242, 249 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), rev. denied, 467 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1985)).
114. Wolmer, 499 So. 2d at 826. The court also suggested that Chrysler lacked constructive
knowledge (i.e., had no reason to know) of the fuel system's danger. See id. (stating that "a
closer reading of [the crash] test results" did not support the district court of appeal's
interpretation that Chrysler was put "on notice of the fuel system defects").
115. The extra factor may be flagrant misconduct. In American Cyanamid, the supreme
court suggested that flagrant misconduct must be present before punitive damages may be
awarded. See American Cyanamid Co. v. Roy, 498 So. 2d 859, 863 (Fla. 1986). In holding
that an award of punitive damages was inappropriate, the court stated, "[T]he facts simply do
not reflect the kind of flagrant misconduct that would justify a finding of willful and wanton
disregard for the safety of persons." Id. (quoting American Cyanamid v. Roy, 466 So. 2d
1079, 1085 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (Anstead, C.J., dissenting), rev'd, 498 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1986)).
A possible explanation of why the court would require flagrant misconduct in addition to
the Restatement definition of recklessness may rest in the court's frequent use of the "public
19881
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B. An Assessment of the Two Interpretations and the Policies
Underlying Punitive Damages
In Florida, the policies that justify the award of punitive dam-
ages in negligence cases are punishment and deterrence.116 These pol-
icies would be frustrated significantly if the Supreme Court of Florida
adopts a standard that requires, in addition to Restatement reckless-
ness, some kind of flagrant conduct or other aggravating circumstance
because such an additional requirement would inject greater subjec-
tivity and unpredictability into the punitive damages inquiry.
Accordingly, the court in future cases should construe the White
criminal manslaughter standard as requiring only knowledge of a
strong probability of harm, not aggravating circumstances, to support
an award of punitive damages. 117
wrong" theory. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer, 499 So. 2d 823, 825 (Fla. 1986);
American Cyanamid Co. v. Roy, 498 So. 2d 859, 861 (Fla. 1986); Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So. 2d
922, 923-24 (Fla. 1976). Under this theory, a tort must create a risk to the public and not just
to individuals before it merits punitive damages. Thus, the scope of the tort, or in other words,
the number of people affected by it, determines whether punitive damages are appropriate.
The application of the public wrong rationale, however, is extremely difficult. On the one
hand, it could be argued that the conduct in White satisfies this theory, as the defective brakes
endangered the public as a whole. On the other hand, one could argue that the loader's
defective brakes posed a danger to only a limited number of construction workers. Hence, not
only is it difficult to determine whether a tort affects the public, but a competent lawyer can
almost always argue that a defendant exposed the public to harm in some way. In addition, it
is unclear why individuals should not receive protection from reckless conduct to the same
extent as would the public. Despite the uncertainties as to exactly what element beyond that of
Restatement recklessness is necessary before punitive damages are merited under the supreme
court's manslaughter standard, it is clear that a standard requiring flagrant misconduct would
represent a policy statement to the lower courts that punitive damages should be awarded
sparingly.
116. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
117. It remains unclear whether the Florida Tort and Insurance Reform Act of 1986 will
have any effect on the punitive damages standard. See Ch. 86-160, Laws of Fla. (codified in
scattered sections of FLA. STAT. chs. 110, 120, 458-59, 624, 626-27, 629, 768 (1987))
[hereinafter FTIRA]. For a general discussion of the Act's provisions, see Fort, Granger,
Polston & Wilkes, Florida's Tort Reform: Response to a Persistent Problem, 14 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 505 (1986) [hereinafter Tort Reform]. Section 52 of the Act limits the amount of
punitive damages that may be awarded to three times the amount of actual damages awarded
in any case based on negligence, strict liability, products liability, professional liability, or
breach of warranty "that involves willful, wanton, or gross misconduct." FTIRA § 52, FLA.
STAT. § 768.73(l)(a) (1987). Because the supreme court has held that gross negligence alone is
insufficient to support an award of punitive damages, the legislature's inclusion of the term
"gross misconduct" in the act "could be considered either excess verbiage or as modifying the
standard under which punitive damages may be awarded." STAFF OF THE FLA. S. COMM. ON
COMMERCE, FLA. MED. MALPRACTICE REFORM AND A REV. OF COURT-ORDERED
ARBITRATION 32-33 (January 1988). In any event, the legislature's use of the term "gross
misconduct" to lower the punitive damages standard is not necessarily inconsistent with the
basic purposes of the Act. The principal purpose of the Act is to alleviate a crisis in the
insurance industry. See FTIRA preamble. In furtherance of this purpose, the Act limited the
amount of noneconomic damages that a claimant could recover to a total of $450,000. Id.
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The policies of punishment and deterrence are furthered only if
persons are able to avoid conduct that would lead to sanctions. One
of the most deeply rooted notions in American jurisprudence is that
punishment for an act is unfair if a person is not on notice that the act
is wrong. 118 Thus, the clearer the punitive damages standard, the
fairer it is to impose punishment. Moreover, the deterrent value of a
sanction is likely to be diminished if persons are not put on reasonable
notice that their conduct will result in punishment. Again, the clearer
the punitive damages standard, the more effective it is as a deter-
rent.119 By offering some degree of notice and predictability, the
Restatement standard for recklessness is better suited to promote the
policies of punishment and deterrence than a standard that focuses on
an undefined requirement of aggravating circumstances or flagrant
misconduct.
Although the Restatement, concededly, does not completely
§ 59, FLA. STAT. § 768.80 (1987). The Supreme Court of Florida recently ruled that this cap
violated the provision in the Constitution of Florida that guarantees access to the courts for
the redress of grievances. See Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1087-89 (Fla.
1987) (striking down section 768.80 as violating article I, section 21 of the Constitution of
Florida). If the court interprets the term "gross misconduct" as lowering the punitive
damages standard, any frustration of the Act's legislative intent by Smith may be partially
mitigated. Some observers have argued that juries will award punitive damages under the
name "mental injuries" if they cannot award them in the form of punitive damages. See, e.g.,
Mallor & Roberts, supra note 2, at 645-46; Note, supra note 2, at 331 & n.149. With a lower
punitive damages standard, juries would be more likely to award a greater amount of damages
under the category of punitive damages rather than that of noneconomic, compensatory
damages. The public policy of Florida prohibits insurance for punitive damages. U.S.
Concrete Pipe Co. v. Bould, 437 So. 2d 1061, 1064 (Fla. 1983). Insurance companies,
therefore, would end up paying less in compensatory damages overall. Thus, even though the
legislature was unable to address the insurance crisis by establishing a cap on noneconomic
damages, it may be successful in combating the crisis by allowing juries to move damages into
a category for which insurance companies are not responsible-punitive damages.
118. See, e.g., Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 49 (1975) (per curiam); Bouie v. City of
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350-51 (1964); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954);
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926); see also H. PACKER, THE LIMITS
OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 79-80 (1968) (noting the "conventional" view "that people are
entitled to know what they are forbidden to do so that they may shape their conduct
accordingly").
119. See Ellis, supra note 10, at 5-6 & n. 19 (arguing that one should not be punished for his
act "unless it has been authoritatively declared to be wrongful before its commission or unless
the actor has otherwise been given prior notice that the act is wrong"); Tort Reform, supra
note 117, at 521 (arguing that "[d]eterrence is facilitated by predictability, which punitive
damage awards are lacking"); Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive
Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, 308-09 (1983) (arguing that the "greatest danger of
underdeterrence arises from the fact that most punitive damages laws do not provide juries
with guidance as to whether punitive damages should be awarded"). But cf Note, The
Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts. A Reappraisal of Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1158, 1179 (arguing that "[it is doubtful whether there is a constitutional right to precise
punitive standards").
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eliminate subjectivity as to what conduct is sufficiently culpable to
merit punitive damages, 121 it does provide guidelines that give some
measure of predictability. The Restatement regime focuses on two
factors-the actor's knowledge and the degree of risk. These factors
are quantifiable, although imprecise, and allow a person to avoid
engaging in conduct that he knows is likely to create a serious risk of
harm to others. In contrast, a standard that focuses on aggravating
circumstances or flagrant misconduct is subjective to a far greater
degree. 121 In applying such a standard, a judge would have little
restraint beyond the dictates of his conscience in deciding whether a
defendant's conduct strikes him as egregious or in some other way
more aggravated than recklessness. 12 2 In light of its adverse effect on
the policies of punishment and deterrence, 23 a requirement under the
120. Comment, supra note 1, at 995 & n.65. Courts historically have struggled to minimize
subjectivity in resolving controversies. The Supreme Court of the United States' attempt to
define obscenity serves as a well-known example of this difficulty. See generally Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The Court has worked hard to
define obscenity and concededly has failed."); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court, in the obscenity cases, has been "faced with
the task of trying to define what may be indefinable"). Yet despite, the difficulty of defining
obscenity, the Court has refused to abandon this task. See Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 197 (Stewart,
J., concurring) ("I know [hard-core pornography] when I see it."). The Court instead has
endeavored to formulate standards that provide some measure of predictability. See Miller,
413 U.S. at 37. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Florida should adopt a punitive damages
standard that affords potential litigants some degree of predictability.
121. One may argue that so long as the supreme court maintains the Restatement standard
as a threshold requirement, the defendant can be said to be on fair notice of what conduct will
result in sanctions and the policy of deterrence therefore will not be compromised. Such an
argument, however, fails to recognize the practical reality that upon hearing such language as
"flagrant conduct" or "aggravating circumstances," the jury is likely to emphasize this part of
the standard over any part that sets forth the more legalistic terminology similar to that of the
Restatement: knowledge of a "strong probability of harm." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 500 comment f(1965). Thus, in actual practice the standard is likely to be applied in
a highly subjective manner.
122. Indeed, such an approach shares some of the same disadvantages as the much-
criticized "outrageous" standard used in cases involving the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. See generally Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the
Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 51-54 (1982) (arguing that the outrageousness "concept ... fails to
provide clear guidance either to those whose conduct it purports to regulate, or to those who
must evaluate that conduct"). Florida courts have accepted the Restatement's formulation of
the elements for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So. 2d 277, 278-79 (Fla. 1985).
123. By requiring aggravating circumstances in addition to Restatement recklessness, the
court would be inviting another problem: the conversion of the punitive damages inquiry into
a battle over semantics. This is because in alleging an aggravating factor, the plaintiff in reality
may be doing nothing more than attempting to restate in a grandiose manner facts that form
an essential element of the Restatement definition of recklessness. In such a case, the
additional requirement of aggravating circumstances would be illusory. For example, an
amicus curiae brief in the supreme court case of American Cyanamid Co. v. Roy suggested
[Vol. 42:803
19881 PUNITIVE DAMAGES
White criminal manslaughter standard that some aggravating circum-
stance exist before the judge may submit the issue of punitive damages
to the jury should not be imposed.
C. The Roles of the Judge and the Jury in Applying the Criminal
Manslaughter Standard
Once the trial judge determines that there is a sufficient basis in
the evidence to support a demand for punitive damages, he then
presents the issue to the jury.124 Juries, however, face two major
obstacles that prevent them from effectively evaluating whether a
defendant's conduct warrants punitive damages. First, in considering
whether a defendant's conduct merits punitive damages, the jury
applies a different standard from the one that the judge applies to
determine whether there is a basis for a punitive damages claim. Sec-
ond, even if the jury were to apply the same standard as does the
judge (i.e., the White criminal manslaughter standard), it would be
hampered by the standard's lack of guidelines as to whether the
defendant's conduct merits punitive damages.
The White criminal manslaughter standard and the standard jury
instruction on punitive damages represent markedly different formu-
lations of when punitive damages are justified. 25  Since White was
decided, a judge allows the jury to consider the issue of punitive dam-
ages if, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
plaintiff, he finds that the character of negligence exhibited by the
that, at least in the area of products liability, a "criminal coverup" is a requisite aggravating
factor for an award of punitive damages. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Florida Defense Lawyers
Association in Support of Petitioner at 2, American Cyanamid Co. v. Roy, 498 So. 2d 859
(Fla. 1986) (No. 67124). Yet a "criminal coverup" might amount simply to a failure to warn
after becoming aware of a defect.
124. See, e.g., Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So. 2d 430, 435-36 (Fla. 1978); Winn &
Lovett Grocery Co. v. Archer, 126 Fla. 306, 328-29, 171 So. 214, 222 (1936); Hospital Corp. of
Lake Worth v. Romaguera, 511 So. 2d 559, 564-65 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). For a general
discussion of Wackenhut, see supra note 62.
125. Before White, judges and juries applied essentially the same standard. During this
time, a sufficient basis for a punitive damages claim existed if a tort was committed "in an
outrageous manner or with fraud, malice, wantonness or oppression." Arab Termite & Pest
Control of Fla., Inc. v. Jenkins, 409 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (Fla. 1982) (quoting Wackenhut, 359
So. 2d at 435-36). This standard was materially the same as the standard jury instruction on
punitive damages, which allows the jury to award punitive damages if it finds that the
defendant "acted with malice, moral turpitude, wantonness, willfulness, or reckless
indifference to the rights of others." FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (Civ.) 6.12 (February 1987).
Although the jury instruction contains reference to recklessness and the standard applied by
the judge did not, this difference was inconsequential because the term recklessness is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term "wantonness," a form of conduct that would
create a sufficient basis for punitive damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500
special note (1965).
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defendant was equivalent to the type of negligence that would justify a
conviction for manslaughter. 26  If a judge finds such a basis to be
present, he then instructs the jury that it may award punitive damages
if it finds that the defendant "acted with malice, moral turpitude,
wantonness, willfulness, or reckless indifference to the rights of
others."' 27 In addition to representing entirely different formula-
tions12 1 of whether punitive damages may be awarded, the two stan-
dards focus on entirely different criteria. Unlike the jury instruction,
which relates to the defendant's subjective state of mind, the criminal
manslaughter standard focuses on acts of the defendant and the con-
sequences of those acts.
29
Because the jury is instructed to apply a different standard, it
never receives the opportunity to fulfill its traditional role as the trier
of fact: to decide whether the defendant's conduct in fact warrants
punitive damages. In other words, a jury might have reservations
about awarding punitive damages if it were able to consider the
defendant's conduct under the criminal manslaughter standard. 3 °
Therefore, to restore the jury to its proper role as the ultimate finder
of fact, the Florida standard jury instruction on punitive damages
should be revised to conform to White.13'
Even if the standard instruction were revised to conform to the
White criminal manslaughter standard, another obstacle would still
confront the jury. The jury would continue to lack guidelines that
would permit it to properly decide whether the defendant's conduct
merits punitive damages. As discussed above, the trial judge himself
cannot be entirely certain what the standard means because recent
supreme court cases can be subjected to two interpretations.'3 2 Yet
the difficulties facing juries are even greater than those facing trial
judges in applying White. Unlike a judge, a jury is unable to compare
126. See supra text accompanying notes 77-81.
127. FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (Civ.) 6.12 (February 1987).
128. For example, although the standard jury instruction allows a jury to award punitive
damages when a defendant has acted with malice, the criminal manslaughter standard does
not even apply to this conduct.
129. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
130. The difficulties continue to the appellate level. Because appellate courts, like trial
judges, review the evidence under the White criminal manslaughter standard, they will also be
applying a different standard than that applied by juries.
131. The Supreme Court of Florida authorized the Supreme Court Committee on Standard
Jury Instructions and The Florida Bar to publish and distribute standard jury instructions. In
re Use by the Trial Courts of the Standard Jury Instructions, 198 So. 2d 319, 319 (Fla. 1967).
The court, however, recognized that a litigant's right to object to the use of a standard
instruction has been maintained. Id.
132. See supra Section IIIA.
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the conduct before it to conduct in prior cases. Rather, the jury's only
tool is the vague language of the criminal manslaughter standard.
The jury instruction should be revised to provide the jury with
more precise guidelines to the question of what kind of conduct war-
rants punitive damages. The instructions should inform juries that
the key factors in determining whether the defendant was reckless are
the degree of the risk created by the defendant's conduct and the
defendant's knowledge of that risk.' 33 The jury instruction, for exam-
ple, could include the criteria contained in the Restatement, that is,
whether the defendant knew or had reason to know that his conduct
created a strong probability of harm."3 Until jury instructions on
punitive damages are revised to include language that is understanda-
ble to laymen, many juries will continue to award punitive damages in
an uninformed manner-and many appellate courts will continue to
reverse them. 135
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of Florida has failed to explain what kind of
conduct actually fulfills the criminal manslaughter standard for puni-
tive damages. The court should interpret the standard as allowing the
issue of punitive damages to be submitted to the jury when the
defendant acts with actual or constructive knowledge that his conduct
is creating a strong probability of harm. An additional requirement of
aggravating circumstances or flagrant misconduct should not be
imposed because it would increase the subjectivity of punitive dam-
ages awards and thereby undermine the goals of punishment and
deterrence. Furthermore, the standard jury instruction on punitive
damages should be revised to conform to such an interpretation to
133. See supra notes 19-25 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. Ironically, the standard jury instruction
that defines the element of "culpable negligence" in criminal manslaughter provides the jury
with greater guidance than the current punitive damages instruction: "Culpable negligence is
consciously doing an act or following a course of conduct that the defendant must have
known, or reasonably should have known, was likely to cause death or great bodily injury."
FLA. STD. JURY INSTR. (CRiM.) 68-68a (May 1987).
135. Recently, litigants recovering punitive damages from juries often have had little
success in preserving their awards on appeal. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer, 499 So. 2d
823 (Fla. 1986) (upholding the trial court's granting of a renewed motion for a directed verdict
after the jury had awarded $3 million in punitive damages); American Cyanamid Co. v. Roy,
498 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 1986) (reversing a punitive damages verdict of $45,000); White Constr.
Co. v. Dupont, 455 So. 2d 1026 (Fla. 1984) (reversing a punitive damages award of $2.5
million); Pantry Pride Enters., Inc. v. Velazquez, 503 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
(reversing an award of punitive damages); Ten Assocs. v. Brunson, 492 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 3d
DCA) (same), rev. denied, 501 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 1986).
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ensure that juries can rationally decide whether to subject a defendant
to liability for punitive damages.
NANETTE A. O'DONNELL
